Introduction
The ongoing financial crisis has underscored the inherent fragility of the international financial system and of its regulatory structure. Originated in the United States, the country that enjoys the most advanced financial markets and is also at the center of the international monetary system (IMS), the crisis was preceded by a bubble in the housing and share markets fuelled by an expansive monetary policy; see Fratianni (2008) . By now, a consensus has developed that the financial regulatory structure needs a significant overhaul. Much less attention has instead received the instability of the dollar-based IMS and the potential that it may have in sparking another deep crisis in the future. The fact that the financial tsunami has not instigated a confidence crisis in the US dollar has fed optimism that the financial crisis may be resolved without substantive changes in the existing international monetary regime. In this vein, at the onset of the crisis, Bernanke (2007) re-affirmed the thesis that the external imbalances of the United States were largely caused by factors taking place outside the United States, namely in fast growing emerging economies (in particular China) and oil-producing countries where ex-ante saving was far in excess of ex-ante investment. The implication of the global saving glut thesis is that the large US external imbalances are largely a temporary phenomenon, rather than structural, and thus would find a natural solution in time.
Another implication of the Bernanke thesis is that the onus of the adjustment problem falls on the periphery rather than on the center country of the dollar-based IMS.
The global saving glut hypothesis diverts attention from the long-term deterioration of the dollar standard. The external deficits of the United States, with the attendant dramatic rise in its net foreign indebtedness, are long dated and result from a fundamental weakness of an IMS where a single national money functions also as an international money, a point that was first identified by Robert Triffin (1960) in the context of the gold-dollar exchange standard.
International Monies, SDRs and Supernational Money by Alessandrini and Fratianni 2 With this premise, the paper argues that the current IMS is fragile because the dollar standard is deteriorating. The dollar remains at the top of the money pyramid because none of the competing international monies, and especially the euro, is ready yet to fully replace the dollar. This scenario is reminiscent of what took place in the inter-war period when sterling was today's dollar and the dollar was an emerging international money.
The long transition from one leading international money to another did not serve us well: it instigated a dark age of protectionism and contributed to the severity of the Great Depression; see Kindleberger (1973) . Like the dollar, the French franc and the German mark in the Thirties, today's euro and currencies of large creditor countries (such as China's yuan) are not ready to take up the money leadership. This historical parallel should give policy makers sufficient incentives to shore up quickly the IMS.
Changes have to be fundamental. To begin with, we must recognize that money and finance are closely intertwined; it is wishful to think that IMS robustness will come by concentrating exclusively in "fixing" the financial system. The IMS itself needs to be fixed and the best time for doing it is now for the simple reason that radical changes in the rules of the game are effected in times of crises.
Our preferred solution would be the creation of a supernational bank money (SBM), which would coexist along side with international monies. We take inspiration from the principles underlying Keynes' old plan for bancor and an international clearing union; see Alessandrini and Fratianni (2009) . These principles tend to resurface in times of stress. Recently, Zhou Xiaochuan (2009) , the governor of the People's Bank of China, has made the case for a restructuring of the IMS around a supernational money, but for practical reasons has then opted for the revitalization of the Special Drawing Rights (SDR). This has found a policy echo in the recommendation of the G20 leaders, at the London April, 2009 meeting, to produce a fresh allocation of $250 billion of SDRs. We argue that dropping more SDRs from a helicopter, without changing the essential characteristics of SDRs, is not a long-term solution. SDRs suffer from two fundamental drawbacks: they are neither money nor a claim on any international institution. The historical record indicates that the SDRs have failed in their intended role as supplement to international reserves. Significant structural changes have to be introduced to make the SDRs work.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a few historical facts about international monies; we emphasize that the money structure tends to be more hierarchical than hegemonic and that the transition period from one dominant money to another is long. Section III keys on the fundamental weakness of an international money that is also a national money. The country that issues the international money faces International Monies, SDRs and Supernational Money by Alessandrini and Fratianni 3 potential conflicts between achieving domestic objectives and maintaining the international public good of a stable money. In the post gold standard, such conflicts are resolved in favor of domestic objectives. Section IV looks at the deteriorating dollar standard and raises the issue of how long can the United States continue to borrow foreign capital without paying a sovereign-risk premium. Section V details the limitations of the SDR scheme. Section VI elaborates on our SBM plan. Conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
International monies
The historical evidence indicates that one currency tends to dominate others both as an international medium of exchange and as a store of value. The Roman silver denarius was the first world currency; the Byzantine solidus was the unchallenged coin from the 5th to the 7th century; Roberto Lopez (1951) calls it the dollar of the Middle Ages. But the international role of the solidus was challenged by the Islamic dinar which eventually made the cross over; both lasted until the 12 th century. In the 13 th century, the Italian coins came to prominence: the Genoese genoino, the Florentine fiorino, and the Venetian ducato. All three coins circulated side by side for quite some time and shared three attributes: large weight (high unitary value), high intrinsic (purchasing power) stability and a leading position in international commerce of the issuer; see Cipolla (1956) .
In the 19 th century, Britain was the leading industrial economy in the world and its currency, the British pound, the leading but not the exclusive international money in the world. The IMS was more hierarchical than hegemonic .
Britain was at the top the pyramid in the international gold standard. Interest rate changes initiated in the periphery prompted a smaller reaction in British interest rates than in the interest rates of the two countries that immediately followed Britain in the hierarchy, France and Germany (Lindert 1969, pp. 49-52) . 1 The pyramidal structure is also corroborated by reserve currency shares data on foreign holdings of major currencies (Lindert, Tables 2 and 3 ). In 1899, foreign-exchange assets at official institutions denominated in pounds represented 63 percent of the total, those denominated in French francs 16 percent, and those denominated in marks 15 percent.
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In 1913, the reserve currency shares in pounds, francs and marks had become, respectively, 48 percent, 31 percent and 15 percent. Quoting from Lindert (1969, p. 25) :
1 For more evidence on the center vs. periphery of the international gold standard, see Eichengreen (1985) and Flandreau et al. (1998) .
2 These shares were computed by subtracting the "unallocated" item from the total in "official institutions" from Lindert's World War I marked the end of Britain's economic and financial leadership; yet, the key status of the pound lasted for more than four more decades (Eichengreen 2005) . The inter-war period left a vacuum in both currency and trade (Kindleberger 1973 see Table 1 . The novel aspect in the data is that the euro has gained at the expense of currencies other than the dollar: the euro share in official reserves has gone from 6.7% of the combined shares of the legacy currencies mark, franc, and guilder in 1973 to 26.5% in 2007. The euro has become an alternative to the dollar to the point that we may characterize the present system as the beginning of a bipolar international money system; see . The status of international monies is rapidly evolving and the end point will be determined by future and thus uncertain policy actions. To see this point, we recall that, other things the same, there is a positive correlation between the relative economic size of the country and its international-currency status. The decline in the dollar share of world reserves after World War II occurred as the U.S. share of world output was falling (Eichengreen and Frankel 1996) . Relative economic size may proxy for the relative transaction domain of the currency; as this shrinks so does the network value of that
International Monies, SDRs and Supernational Money by Alessandrini and Fratianni 6 currency. On this score, the formation of EMU gave the euro a big push in competing against the dollar for the position of dominant currency. On the other hand, the euro had to overcome the serious handicap that it was issued by a new and untested central bank, the European Central Bank (ECB), representing a group of countries that had yet to achieve political unification. While the ECB is now a tested institution that has earned a considerable amount of reputation as inflation fighter, political unification is not on the horizon. Without political unification, the euro project will remain incomplete and so will the challenge of the euro to the preeminence of the dollar.
In sum, the dollar remains the leading international currency, but with the ascent of the euro the system is becoming increasingly bipolar. As we will argue in Section VI, a bipolar structure world could be exploited to create a supernational money, based on the foundations of the two international monies and a clearing mechanism.
Conflicts between domestic and international objectives
The inherent flaw in using an international money that is also a national money is that the issuing country faces a conflict between pursuing domestic objectives of employment and inflation and maintaining the international public good of a stable money. There are circumstances in which the twin objectives cannot be reconciled simultaneously and a choice must be made as to which objective dominates. During the international gold standard, domestic objectives were often sacrificed for the benefit of preserving the gold parity. Adherence to the external constraint was made easier by limited suffrage and a political system less reactive to pressure groups. In Britain, which was at the center of the international gold standard, twice the conflict between domestic and foreign objectives was resolved by the country accepting massive domestic deflation to restore convertibility between gold and paper currency: the first time after 1815, in preparation for the "restoration" decision that took place in 1821; and the second after
World War II, in preparation for the decision to resume the gold standard in 1925. John
Maynard Keynes (1925) wrote a pamphlet blasting the action taken by Winston
Churchill, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and predicting correctly that Britain would go into further painful deflation. 4 Churchill himself came to regret his decision claiming that he had been badly misled by Montagu Norman, the Governor of the Bank of England.
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In the post World War II era -with complete suffrage and a political system more reactive to pressure groups-conflicts between domestic and external objectives tend to be resolved in favor of the former, except when the external constraint is really binding.
This has been particularly true for the United States, which has enjoyed a soft external constraint. For example, the end of the Bretton Woods system was hastened in the second half of the 1960s when the United States was unwilling to tax its residents to pay for a foreign war (Vietnam) and a domestic war (Poverty). Faced with stark choices between domestic and international objectives, the reserve currency country placed the former above the latter. The costs of being a reserve currency country were perceived to be too large relative to the benefits; the United States generated an inflation rate that was The relative indifference of US policy makers towards balance-of-payments deficits and, later, about the value of the dollar in relation to other important currencies became known as "benign neglect." A resurgence of this policy has occurred in the middle of this decade and is known as the saving glut hypothesis; see Bernanke (2005) . According to this view, an exogenous upward shift of the saving functions in fast-growing Asian and oil-producing economies, unmatched by a comparable shift in their investment functions, was the cause of the large US capital inflows since the middle of the nineties.
The resulting ex-ante gap between saving and investment is responsible for currentaccount surpluses in the emerging countries and falling real rates of interest in the world. According to the saving glut hypothesis, the industrial world, but primarily the United States, had to absorb the capital inflows generated by Asia and oil-producing countries. Once the shock peters out, current-account imbalances will be reduced. As we 5 Later in his life, Churchill judged that his decision of letting Britain return to the gold standard at pre-war parity was "the biggest blunder in his life" (Ahamed 2009, p. 239) .
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In sum, a national money that becomes an international money cannot serve two masters equally well. In the tug of war between domestic and international objectives, political economy considerations dictate that domestic goals of employment and inflation tend to win at the expense of the maintenance of the international public good.
It follows that an effective reform of the international monetary must resolve the dual role of domestic/international money. At the moment, policy makers are betting on resuscitating the SDRs, a theme to which we return in Section V below.
The deteriorating dollar standard
The dollar standard has been deteriorating over the last three decades as a result of the US economy systematically spending beyond its domestic output and becoming, in the process, the largest net debtor in the world. Table 2 discrepancy between the sum of deficit flows and changes in net foreign debt is due to the international role of the dollar, which permits the United States, not only to earn foreign seigniorage, but to act as the "banker of the world" in the language of Despres, Kindleberger, and Salant (1966) . That is, the United States borrows short at relative low rates of interest and lends long at high rates of return. The banker-to-the-world analogy can be extended into a modern leveraged-financial-intermediary view, as in Gourinchas and Rey (2005) . Under this scenario, the United States is issuing not only short-term liabilities but also fixed-income liabilities that are leveraged to effect investments abroad in the form of illiquid, but with high capital gain potential, foreign direct investments and equities. The excess rates of return on U.S. assets over U.S. liabilities captures the "exorbitant privilege" the United States earns because of its special role in the international monetary system.
The data of Table 3 Finally, the very structure of the SDRs assigns to the IMS a largely passive role.
To better understand the discrepancy between policy makers' expectations and likely outcome, we start by recalling that the "SDR is neither a currency, nor a claim on the IMF. Rather, it is a potential claim on the freely usable currencies of IMF members" (IMF 2009). Once a decision has been made by an allocation of SDRs, the IMF has no discretionary power on its uses. Under the present system, exchanges of SDRs for national currencies occur either through voluntary bilateral transactions or through the IMF that may designate member countries with external surpluses to accept SDRs in exchange for their currencies. Thus, the IMF acts as a broker matching deficit to surplus countries to exchange SDRs for international monies. The transactions remain bilateral.
Each member country receives an amount of SDRs that is proportional to its quota in the Fund, without any necessary ex-ante consideration about the external liquidity of the country. After the allocation, a deficit country (DC) can swap SDRs for an equivalent amount of international money, say dollars, at a surplus country (SC). The price of the swap is an interest rate (equal to a weighted average of the money market of the four currencies in the SDR basket) paid by DC to SC. After the swap, DC has more dollars and less SDRs; the opposite is true for SC. DC can use the acquired dollars to intervene in the exchange markets, while SC can use the acquired SDRs to diversify the currency composition of its international reserves. In essence, the mechanics are those of a "giro system" (Machlup 1968, p. 13) aimed at stabilizing exchange rates.
The SDR scheme is designed to activate hoarded international money. The latter is redistributed from SC to DC countries. But there is very little that SDRs can do to improve the position of the largest deficit and net external debtor country in the world.
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The United States is unique in both the size of its external imbalances and as a provider of the dominant international money. The US share of the new SDR 250 billion is paltry relative to the size of the US external imbalance. To make a dent on the problem would (Boughton 2001, ch. 18) . Had the Substitution Account been implemented, we would have avoided the large overhang of dollar reserves that now threatens the durability of the international dollar standard.
The importance of reforming the existing SDR mechanism in a supernational direction has been raised recently by Zhou Xiaochuan (2009) , the Governor of the People's Bank of China. China, more than any other country, is exposed to the risk of an implosion of the dollar standard and feels urgently the need to diversify out of dollar assets. Given that the yuan is not an international money, there is an obvious Chinese interest in seeing the transformation of the dollar standard into a supernational money standard. As we have mentioned it in the introduction, Mr. Xiaochuan has chosen to endorse the SDRs and suggest at the same time a series of recommendations that would make them converge progressively to a supernational money. Among the recommendations, it is worth mentioning the following three: transforming the SDR from an artificial basket currency into one backed by assets; establishing a settlement system between the SDR and national currencies so as to make the SDR a fully fledged money; and linking the SDRs to a specific institution that would be responsible for their management and their value, in other words they have to be someone's liability.
Supernational Bank Money
The current, deep, financial crisis creates almost a unique opportunity for a gradual introduction of a supernational money aimed at reducing the asymmetries of the key- Such deposits we will call supernational bank money (or S.B.M for short)" . Excluding gold, our approach is the same.
payments, the "exorbitant privilege" of the United States as a key-currency country would cease. Clearly, the Fed would have to accept such a mechanism.
The clearing system could not work without explicit rules of the game, such as the size of the overdraft facility, the terms of repayment of the overdraft, and who bears the burden of external adjustment. In an inflationary environment, it would be up to DCs to contract domestic spending; consequently, overdraft facilities would have to be contained. In a recessionary environment, it would be up to SCs to raise domestic spending; consequently, overdraft facilities would have to be more expansive than in an inflationary environment.
Conclusions
The dollar-based IMS is fragile. This fragility manifests itself in large and long-lived external deficits of the dominant key-currency country. The United States enjoys the privilege of borrowing in the world financial markets at low interest rates without paying a sovereign risk premium commensurate with its level of foreign debt. The interest rate "subsidy," in turn, does not give the United States an incentive to make the necessary policy adjustments to align long-term domestic consumption with long-term domestic output. The end result is that US net foreign debt is growing; with that grows the risk of an implosion of the dollar-based IMS. The inherent weakness of the current IMS is that it relies on an international money that is also a national money: This dual role cannot be easily reconciled because the Fed faces a conflict between pursuing domestic objectives of employment and inflation and maintaining the international public good of a stable money. This conflict is typically resolved in favor of domestic objectives.
We have argued that the time to fix the IMS is now for the simple reason that radical changes are best made in times of crises. China, the largest creditor country and the most exposed to a possible implosion of the dollar-based IMS has expressed -through the voice of its central bank governor, Zhou Xiaochuan--the merits of restructuring the IMS around a supernational money. However, for practical reasons, China has advocated the revitalization of SDRs. The G20 leaders have obliged. But the SDR scheme is weak. As presently constituted, SDRs are neither money nor a claim on an international institution; are issued exogenously without any direct consideration to countries' financing needs; and can activate international monies only through bilateral transactions. As supplements to international reserves, the SDRs have failed in the past. 
